E-Learning-Inclusivo (Mashup)
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E-Learning-Inclusivo (Mashup)
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3 tips for mobile pedagogy in the classroom | #mLEARNing #EdTech #ICT 

3 tips for mobile pedagogy in the classroom | #mLEARNing #EdTech #ICT  | E-Learning-Inclusivo (Mashup) | Scoop.it
The integration of mobile technology in classrooms is no longer just a nice-to-have option in learning and development. Indeed, it has now become an essential part of the educational process for the 21st century generation…

 

Learn more / En savoir plus / Mehr erfahren:

 

https://gustmees.wordpress.com/2016/02/18/the-new-possibilities-to-learn-and-teach-with-ict/

 


Via Gust MEES, Nancy Jones
Gust MEES's curator insight, June 17, 2016 9:28 AM

The integration of mobile technology in classrooms is no longer just a nice-to-have option in learning and development. Indeed, it has now become an essential part of the educational process for the 21st century generation…

 

Learn more / En savoir plus / Mehr erfahren:

 

https://gustmees.wordpress.com/2016/02/18/the-new-possibilities-to-learn-and-teach-with-ict/

 

 

Rescooped by juandoming from 21st Century Learning and Teaching
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Forensic scientist identifies suspicious 'back doors' running on every iOS device | Privacy | Cyberespionage

Forensic scientist identifies suspicious 'back doors' running on every iOS device | Privacy | Cyberespionage | E-Learning-Inclusivo (Mashup) | Scoop.it
During his talk at HOPE/X Jonathan Zdziarski detailed several undocumented services (with names like 'lockdownd,' 'pcapd,' 'mobile.file_relay,' and 'house_arrest') that run in the background on over 600 million iOS devices.


Zdziarski's questions for Apple include:

  • Why is there a packet sniffer running on 600 million personal iOS devices instead of moved to the developer mount?
  • Why are there undocumented services that bypass user backup encryption that dump mass amounts of personal data from the phone?
  • Why is most of my user data still not encrypted with the PIN or passphrase, enabling the invasion of my personal privacy by YOU?
  • Why is there still no mechanism to review the devices my iPhone is paired with, so I can delete ones that don’t belong?

... and his last slide (page 57 of the PDF) sums it up nicely: 


  • Apple is dishing out a lot of data behind our backs
  • It’s a violation of the customer’s trust and privacy to bypass backup encryption
  • There is no valid excuse to leak personal data or allow packet sniffing without the user’s knowledge and permission.
  • Much of this data simply should never come off the phone, even during a backup.
  • Apple has added many conveniences for enterprises that make tasty attack points for .gov and criminals
  • Overall, the otherwise great security of iOS has been compromised… by Apple… by design.

Learn more:




Via Gust MEES
Gust MEES's curator insight, July 21, 2014 9:26 AM
  • Apple is dishing out a lot of data behind our backs
  • It’s a violation of the customer’s trust and privacy to bypass backup encryption
  • There is no valid excuse to leak personal data or allow packet sniffing without the user’s knowledge and permission.
  • Much of this data simply should never come off the phone, even during a backup.
  • Apple has added many conveniences for enterprises that make tasty attack points for .gov and criminals
  • Overall, the otherwise great security of iOS has been compromised… by Apple… by design.

Gust MEES's curator insight, July 21, 2014 9:31 AM
During his talk at HOPE/X Jonathan Zdziarski detailed several undocumented services (with names like 'lockdownd,' 'pcapd,' 'mobile.file_relay,' and 'house_arrest') that run in the background on over 600 million iOS devices.


Zdziarski's questions for Apple include:

  • Why is there a packet sniffer running on 600 million personal iOS devices instead of moved to the developer mount?
  • Why are there undocumented services that bypass user backup encryption that dump mass amounts of personal data from the phone?
  • Why is most of my user data still not encrypted with the PIN or passphrase, enabling the invasion of my personal privacy by YOU?
  • Why is there still no mechanism to review the devices my iPhone is paired with, so I can delete ones that don’t belong?

... and his last slide (page 57 of the PDF) sums it up nicely: 


  • Apple is dishing out a lot of data behind our backs
  • It’s a violation of the customer’s trust and privacy to bypass backup encryption
  • There is no valid excuse to leak personal data or allow packet sniffing without the user’s knowledge and permission.
  • Much of this data simply should never come off the phone, even during a backup.
  • Apple has added many conveniences for enterprises that make tasty attack points for .gov and criminals
  • Overall, the otherwise great security of iOS has been compromised… by Apple… by design.

Learn more:


Rescooped by juandoming from 21st Century Learning and Teaching
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How to Hack a Mobile App: It's Easier than You Think!

How to Hack a Mobile App: It's Easier than You Think! | E-Learning-Inclusivo (Mashup) | Scoop.it
How hackers are attacking binary code and mobile app vulnerabilities, and what you can do about it.


Learn more:


http://gustmees.wordpress.com/2014/03/05/often-asked-questions-are-there-cyber-security-dangers-with-apps-and-whats-about-privacy/



Via Gust MEES
Gust MEES's curator insight, August 7, 2014 11:44 AM
How hackers are attacking binary code and mobile app vulnerabilities, and what you can do about it.


Learn more:


http://gustmees.wordpress.com/2014/03/05/often-asked-questions-are-there-cyber-security-dangers-with-apps-and-whats-about-privacy/


Rescooped by juandoming from 21st Century Learning and Teaching
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BYOD: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly [Infographic]

BYOD: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly [Infographic] | E-Learning-Inclusivo (Mashup) | Scoop.it

Via Gust MEES